Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Jerry V. Strand v. Prince-Covey and Co., INC., and
Almon Covey : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard J. Leedy; Attorney for Respondent.
Prince, Yeates, Ward, Miller, and Geldzahler; Frederick S. Prince, Jr; Michael F. Heyrend; J. Rand
Hirschi; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Strand v. Prince-Covey and Co., No. 13804.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/962

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY}

IN THE SUPREME COlg&J
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1975

BRIGI1AM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,

JERRY V. STRAND,
Vl
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1

R c u b e n CSark U w S c h

vs

*
v
PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC., and
(
ALMON COVEY,
)
Defendant-Appellant. J

Case No.
13804

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
of the
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD,
MILLER & GELDZAHLER
Frederick S. Prince, Jr., Esq.
Michael F. Heyrend, Esq.
J. Rand Hirschi, Esq.
455 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
RICHARD J. LEEDY, ESQ.
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

• « & , :

1
\\

«w
'«ESP

\.JS$SS2

f\IOV9

*

2 'il\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

°° [

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE
WERE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACTS AND PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW

7

A. KNOWLEDGE OF AN ADVERSE CLAIM
IS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO
LIABILITY FOR CONVERSION OF A
NEGOTIABLE SECURITY AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
KNOWLEDGE TO BE UNNECESSARY
OR IN IMPUTING SUCH KNOWLEDGE
TO DEFENDANT

8

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
DETERMINED THAT NO ISSUES OF
FACT EXISTED CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S OWNERSHIP OF THE STOCK

18

C

A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTED AS TO
THE PROPER DATE FOR FIXING
DAMAGES
22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT AND FOR REHEARING
25
POINT III
IF JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT IS AFFIRMED, THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER A
SET-OFF BETWEEN THIS JUDGMENT AND
A PRIOR FINAL JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY
DEFENDANT AGAINST PLAINTIFF
27
CONCLUSION

29

APPENDIX

31
AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases
AUred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726 (1958)
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir., 1940)
Bank of America v. Barnett, 87 Ariz. 96,
348 P.2d 296 (I960)
Bloomberg v. Taggart,
213 Minn. 39, 5 N.W.2d 388 (1942)
Campbell v. Peters,
108 Utah 565, 162 P.2d 754 (1945)
Cross v. United States,
336F.2d431 (2d Cir. 1964)
Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson,
9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 (1959)
E. S. Woodworth & Co. v. Carroll,
104 Minn. 65, 112 N.W. 1054
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn,
13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962)

8
20
15
16
22
19
24
14
21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
George H. Sasser & Co. v. Chuck Wagon System,
50N.M. 136, 172 P.2d 818 (1946)
Green v. Garn, 11 Utah 2d 375,
359 P.2d 1050 (1961)
10,
Hayes v. Bank of Arizona,
57 Ariz. 8, 110 P.2d 235 (1941)
Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc.,
11 Utah 2d 138, 355 P.2d 973 (I960)
Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, Peoria v. W. Heller
& Son, 305 111. App. 644, 27 N.E.2d 844 (1940) ..

16
21
16
10
17

Johnson v. Flowers,
119 Utah 425, 228 P.2d 406 (1951)
21
Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 233 P.2d 365 (1951).. 21
McLean v. Paddock, 78 N.M. 235,430 P.2d 392 (1967) 15
Montgomery v. Commercial Trust & Savings Bank,
286 111. App. 241, 3 N.E.2d 139 (1936)
17
Powerine Co. v. Russell's Inc.,
103 Utah 441,135 P.2d 906 (1943)
13
Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. v. Jerry V. Strand,
29 Utah 2d 224, 507 P.2d 708 (1973)
5, 27
Snow v. West, 37 Utah 528, 110 P. 52 (1910)
27
Steunenberg v. National Progressive Life Ins. Co.,
138 Neb. 240, 292 N.W. 737 (1940)
Tallhatchie Home Bank v. Aldridge,
169 Miss. 597, 153 S. 818 (1934)
Union Old Lowell National Bank v. Paine,
318 Mass. 313, 61 N.E.2d 666 (1945)
Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining
Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 P. 664 (1920)
13, 16,

16
16
16
24

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Statutes
Utah Code Annotated (1953), §70A-1-201(19)

10

Utah Code Annotated (1953), §70A-8-201 (44)

10

Utah Code Annotated (1953), §70A-8-301(l)

9, 10

Utah Code Annotated (1953), §70A-8-302

11

Utah Code Annotated (1953), §70A-8-304(2)

11

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(b)

23

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a)

28

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c)

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)

26

Texts
Restatement 2d, Agency §279
Restatement 2d, Torts, §222A
Restatement 2d, Torts §229
Annotation, "Conversion of Stock — Damages",
31 A.L.R. 3d 1286
Annotation, 121 A.L.R. 478 (1939)
47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §§999-1013

13
21
8
24, 25
27
27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JERRY V. STRAND,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC., and
ALMON COVEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13804

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent Jerry V. Strand (referred to
hereinafter as plaintiff) brought this action alleging that
defendant-appellant Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. (hereinafter defendant1), converted negotiable securities allegedly
owned by plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court for the Third Judicial District in
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall
presiding, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judg1

The trial court did not enter judgment against the individual defendant, Almon Covey, and plaintiffs claims against
Mr. Covey are not before this Court.
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment and awarded damages of $26,000. Defendant's
subsequent motion to set aside judgment and for rehearing
was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an order of this court vacating the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court and remanding the case for further proceedings. In the alternative, if the judgment is affirmed, defendant seeks an order
of this court directing satisfaction of the judgment by setoff against a prior final judgment obtained by defendant
against plaintiff in the amount of $34,696.16, together
with interest, no part of which has been satisfied to date.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During 1972 defendant Prince-Covey & Co. incurred
substantial losses from transactions in which its employee,
Mr. Ted England, acted as trader and from the failure of
Mr. England's customers to pay for purchases on accounts
for which he acted as account executive. As is customary
in the brokerage business, Mr. England had agreed to repay his employer for the losses. (R. 19-20).
Almon Covey, the president and a director of defendant Prince-Covey & Co., inquired as to when defendant might expect payment and was advised by Mr. England that the latter had a personal loan at Murray First
Thrift & Loan of Salt Lake City secured by the pledge of
4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock. These shares
had a current market value greater than the total of Mr.
England's loan. Mr. England agreed that if defendant
2
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would pay Mr. England's debt to Murray First Thrift,
thereby obtaining release of the stock, Mr. England would
sell the stock, repay defendant for the Murray First Thrift
payment and use the balance of the proceeds to pay or
reduce his debt to defendant. (R. 20).
Mr. Covey accompanied Mr. England to Murray
First Thrift where Mr. Covey delivered defendant's check
to pay the loan and Murray First Thrift released and delivered to Mr. England certificates representing at least
4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock. The certificates were in bearer form; neither plaintiff's nor Mr. England's name appeared on them. Mr. Covey and Mr. England returned to the Prince-Covey & Co. offices where
4,000 shares of the stock were deposited in England's personal account and sold. The proceeds were given to defendant Prince-Covey & Co. to repay it for the money
advanced to Murray First Thrift and to pay or reduce
England's debt to defendant. (R. 20). The balance of the
stock was retained by England. (R. 37).
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he owned the
4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock and had
"pledged" them in January of 1972 to Mr. England, who
in turn had pledged them to Murray First Thrift. There is
no explanation as to what plaintiff means when he says he
"pledged" the stock. Defendant, in its answer, denied
plaintiff's allegations of ownership, and, in any event,
Mr. Almon Covey's affidavit denied knowledge or belief
of such a fact. (R. 23-24), Plaintiff Jerry Strand filed no
affidavit to support his purported ownership of the stock
or to support any other allegation in his complaint. Mr.

3
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England's affidavit stated that he "borrowed" the stock
from plaintiff and that he "knew" plaintiff owned it. (R.
19-21). Mr. England's affivadit contains strained and selfserving statements to the effect that Mr. Covey might
have inferred that plaintiff owned the stock. (R. 20-21).
At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, in addition to the complaint and answer, the
court considered the affidavit of Mr. Ted England filed by
plaintiff (R. 19-21) and the affidavit of Mr. Almon Covey
filed by defendant. (R. 23-24). Mr. Covey's affidavit was
presented to the court at the commencement of the hearing, although it appears in the record after the minute
entry noting the granting of summary judgment,
Defendant filed additional affidavits in support of its
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for Rehearing from
Michael F. Heyrend (R. 44-45), Almon Covey (R. 34-43),
and David Nelson (R. 46-51). For the convenience of the
court, the complaint, answer, and affidavits are included as
appendixes to this brief, except for the record of Ted
England's personal trading account which was attached
to Mr. Covey's second affidavit.
The trial court ruled that defendant's lack of knowledge of plaintiff's ownership or claim of ownership was
not a defense to a claim for conversion of negotiable securities. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that, even if
knowledge was a necessary element in the conversion of
negotiable securities, Mr. England's knowledge of plaintiff's alleged ownership must be imputed to defendant
because of the employer-employee relationship between

4
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them. The trial court so ruled despite the statements in
Mr. England's affidavit that he and defendant were adverse parties with respect to this transaction. Moreover,
Mr. England's affidavit indicates clearly that his dealings
with plaintiff were not of a nature that would further
his employer's interests, since Mr. England was acting on
his own behalf and for his own benefit. (R. 20).
There is nothing in the record to indicate when plaintiff received notice of the alleged conversion. An affidavit
of Mr. Mark E. McBride, not controverted by defendant,
establishes that on one day in September 1972 Hoffman
Resources Corporation was quoted at $6.25 bid and $6.75
asked. (R. 12).
The affidavit of Michael F. Heyrend (R. 44-45) filed
in connection with defendant's motion for a new hearing
establishes that on or about May 11, 1972, in the earlier
case of Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. v. Jerry V. Strand, defendant Prince-Covey & Co. was awarded judgment
against plaintiff in the amount of $34,696.16 for plaintiffs
failure to pay for stock he ordered.2 In the course of defendant's attempts to collect this judgment, plaintiff gave
testimony pursuant to an order in supplemental proceedings on July 20, 1972 and testified under oath that as of
that date he owned no stock of any company other than
7,000 to 8,000 shares of Dusenberg Corporation, that he
owned options on 20,000 shares of Hoffman Resources
stock at $3.00 per share, but did not then own any Hoff2

The judgment set out in Mr. Heyrend's affidavit was affirmed by this Court; Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. v. Strand, 29
Utah 2d 224, 507 P.2d 708 (1973).
5
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man Resources stock, and that the only note or chose in
action he owned was a $5,000 debt owed by a Mr. Al
Johnson. At no point in the course of the examination,
during which plaintiff was asked specifically what shares
of stock he owned, was the Hoffman Resources stock in
question in this lawsuit mentioned. (R. 44-45). This testimony of July 20, 1972 directly contradicts plaintiff's allegation of ownership in his complaint because in the instant action plaintiff alleges that he "pledged" the Hoffman stock to England in January 1972 (R. 1), that the
stock was then pledged by England to Murray First Thrift
in January 1972 (R. 19) and that plaintiff owned the
stock on August 2, 1972, the date of the alleged conversion. (R. 1).
In his affidavit filed in support of the motion for rehearing, Mr. Almon Covey established that the Murray
First Thrift loan was repaid and the shares obtained on
August 2, 1972. (R. 36). Mr. England's affidavit, which
was used by the court below to fix damages, stated that the
shares were obtained and sold on approximately September 13, 1972. (R. 20). Mr. England's personal account
which was attached to Mr. Covey's affidavit supports Mr.
Covey's position and contradicts the position of Mr. England. (R.43).
In the same affidavit, Mr. Covey discloses the details
of Mr. England's position with Prince-Covey & Co. Mr.
England was allowed to maintain a private brokerage account at Prince-Covey & Co., the use and maintenance of
which was entirely personal and was not related to his
duties as a registered representative of defendant. (R. 3536). Mr. England's debt to Prince-Covey & Co. arose from
6
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losses on his unauthorized actions or administrative errors
as a trader and a registered representative and this debt
was entirely personal to Mr. England and established between him and defendant Prince-Covey & Co. the relationship of debtor-creditor. (R. 36) It was within the
context of this debtor-creditor relationship that Mr. Covey
agreed to advance money for the repayment of the loan
to Murray First Thrift and Mr. England agreed that, upon
obtaining the shares of Hoffman Resources, he would sell
the same and repay the amount of the Murray First Thrift
loan plus all or a portion of his debt to defendant. (R.
36). The sale of the shares was effected through Mr. England's personal account. (R. 37).
The record of Mr. England's personal account attached to Mr. Covey's affidavit shows conclusively that there
was a substantial number of trades in the Hoffman Resources stock during the year 1972, contrary to the statements contained in Mr. England's affidavit. (R. 39-43).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THERE WERE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACTS AND PLAINTIFF WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Substantial issues of material facts remained unresolved when the trial court entered its judgment. No evidence was before the court from which it could properly
fix a date for determining the value of the stock allegedly
converted. There were no facts other than the allegations

7
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of the complaint establishing plaintiffs ownership of the
stock. The pleadings and affidavits placed squarely in
issue the question of whether defendant was a bona fide
purchaser of the negotiable securities. Defendant introduced evidence establishing that it acted as a bona fide
purchaser and therefore took the securities free and clear
of any adverse claims. Mr. Almon Covey's affidavit established defendant as a bona fide purchaser of the negotiable securities since the defendant had no knowledge of
plaintiff's purported ownership interest in the stock. On
this issue the only way the trial court could find such
knowledge in light of Mr. Covey's affidavit was to impute
Ted England's knowledge to defendant. This was error
since England's interests were established in the record as
adverse to defendant's with respect to the transactions in
question.
A. KNOWLEDGE OF AN ADVERSE CLAIM IS
A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO LIABILITY FOR
CONVERSION OF A NEGOTIABLE SECURITY AND
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING KNOWLEDGE TO BE UNNECESSARY OR IN IMPUTING
SUCH KNOWLEDGE TO DEFENDANT.
Although in most instances a purchaser of goods may
be liable for their conversion even though he is without
knowledge of any adverse claims,3 the rule is opposite with
3

"Although conversion results only from intentional conduct it does not however require a conscious wrongdoing, but
only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods
inconsistent with the owner's right . . . thus a bona fide purchaser of goods for value from one who has no right to sell them
becomes a converter when he takes possession of such goods."
Allred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958). See
also Restatement 2d, Torts, §229.

8
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respect to a bona fide purchaser of negotiable securities.
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code (§70A-8-301(2),
Utah Code Annotated) provides:
A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring
the rights of a purchaser also acquires the security
free of any adverse claim? (Emphasis added.)
If Prince-Covey & Co. was a bona fide purchaser, it
took the securities free of any adverse claim, including
plaintiff's, and plaintiff has a cause of action only against
Mr. England for his admitted conversion of the stock.
This section of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code embodies prior Utah law as expressed in, e.g., Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d
954 (1954), and the law of other jurisdictions, e.g., East
Coalinga Oil Fields Corp. v. Robinson, 86 Cal. 2d 153, 194
P.2d 554 (1948); McCullen v. Hereford State Bank, 214
F.2d 185 (5th Cir., 1954), all of which state the rule that
a bona fide purchaser takes securities free of any adverse
claim.
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code defines the
attributes of a bona fide purchaser:
4
Section 70A-8-301(l), Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines "adverse claim" to include plaintiff's claim in this action:
"Upon delivery of a security the purchaser acquires the
rights in the security which his transferor had or had
actual authority to convey except that a purchaser who
has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the security or who as a prior holder had notice of an
adverse claim cannot improve his position by taking from
a later bona fide purchaser. (Adverse claim9 includes a
claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a
particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest
in the security." (emphasis added)

9
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A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value
in good faith and without notice of any adverse
claim who takes delivery of a security in bearer
form or of one in registered form issued to him or
endorsed to him in blank. §70A-2-302, U.C.A.
There is no dispute that the stock received from
Murray First Thrift was in bearer form. There should be
no question that defendant gave "value" since it extinguished Mr. England's debt to it.5 There can also be
no question but that the "adverse claim" of ownership
alleged by plaintiff is among those that cannot be asserted against a bona fide purchaser for value.6 Good faith is
defined by the Code as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."1 Certainly there is nothing in the
record to impugn Mr. Covey's honesty.
The trial court's determinative conclusion must, then,
have been that defendant, through Almon Covey, had
notice of plaintiff's adverse claim, and that this notice was
established by the pleadings and affidavits in conformance
with the stringent standards required for summary judgment.8 This conclusion is not supported in the record.
5

Section 70A-1-201 (44), Utah Code Annotated, (1953).
Section 70A-8-301(l), Utah Code Annotated, defining "adverse claim", set out in footnote 4, supra.
7
Section 70A-1-201U9), Utah Code Annotated (1953) (emphasis added).
8
The pertinent provisions of Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, provide that summary judgment shall be rendered only if there is on a showing "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (emphasis added).
Summary judgment should be granted with great caution,
Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Utah 2d 46,354 P.2d 852; only upon a showing that precludes all reasonable possibility that the loser might
prevail at trial, Green v. Gam, 11 Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050;
with all doubts resolved in favor of permitting trial, Henry v.
Washiki Club, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 138, 355 P.2d 973.
6

10
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Mr. Covey's affidavit filed at the time of the hearing
on plaintiffs motion for summary judgment states that
he did not have knowledge of any adverse claim of plaintiff Strand. This lack of actual knowledge is not controverted in the record by plaintiff and even Mr. England's
affidavit indicates only that Mr. Covey should have been
on notice that England held the securities for a third person, possibly Mr. Strand. Notice of an adverse claim under
§70A-8-302, U.CA. is defined in §70A-8-304(2), U.C.A.:
The fact that the purchaser (including a broker
for the seller or buyer) has notice that the security
is held for a third person . . . does not create a
duty to inquire into the rightfulness of the transfer or constitute notice of adverse claims. If, however, the purchaser . . . has knowledge that the
proceeds are being used or that the transaction is
for the individual benefit of the fiduciary or otherwise in breach of duty, the purchaser is charged
with notice of adverse claims. (Emphasis added)
Even if England's statement to the effect that Mr.
Covey should have been on notice that England held the
securities for a third person had been uncontroverted, the
above section makes clear that no duty was thereby created on defendant's part to inquire into the rightfulness
of the transfer, let alone that such "notice" constituted
"notice of adverse claims" under §70A-8-302. The actual
knowledge required by the last sentence of $304(2) was
unequivocally denied in Mr. Covey's affidavit presented
to the court at the time of the motion for summary judgment hearing. (R. 23-24).
The plaintiff failed to show defendant's actual knowledge of plaintiffs alleged ownership. Nevertheless the
11
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court below imputed England's knowledge of plaintiff's
ownership of the stock to the defendant. This was error,
England's knowledge could be imputed to Prince-Covey
only if England was acting as an agent of Prince-Covey in
the transaction. While an agent's knowledge is imputed
to his principal if the knowledge is gained or used in the
course and scope of the agent's employment, there can
be no imputation when the agent is acting adversely to the
principal. As stated in Restatement 2d, Agency §279:
The principal is not affected by the knowledge of
an agent as to matters involved in a transaction
in which the agent deals with the principal or another agent of the principal as, or on the account
of, an adverse party.
Illustration 2 to that section is on all fours with the instant
case:
Having obtained goods from T by fraud, A conveys them to P in consideration of the extinguishment of a debt due P from A. P is not bound by
A's knowledge in a jurisdiction in which the extinguishment of an antecedent debt is value.
It was uncontroverted in the trial court that England was
acting entirely for his own personal benefit, outside the
scope of his employment, when he obtained the Hoffman
stock from plaintiff for use as security for a personal loan.
These transactions did not involve his employer in any
sense. More importantly, however, Mr. England's actions
in obtaining the shares from Murray First Thrift, selling
them and applying the proceeds to his debt to defendant
were not within the scope of his employment. As was well
established in the record before the trial court, England
12
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dealt with defendant in these transactions as an adverse
party. For England to accomplish his purpose he had to
conceal his knowledge (or belief) as to plaintiff's ownership in the stock. Failure to conceal this knowledge would
have led Prince-Covey to execute on the stock in order to
satisfy its pre-existing $34,600 judgment against plaintiff, and England would have continued to owe his personal debt to defendant.9 Under these circumstances the
agent, England, had to avoid disclosure to his principal,
Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. These circumstances fall squarely
within the universally accepted rule expressed in Restatement 2d, Agency §279, which has been applied in Utah
as well as most other jurisdictions.
In Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135
P.2d 906 (1943) the court stated that where "the agent
was acting adversely to the principal . . . his knowledge
and actions cannot be imputed to his principal," and that
this "is the exception to the general rule that the knowledge and acts of the agent will be imputed to the principal." (135 P.2d at 912). In Western Securities Co. v.
Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 P. 664
(1920) the court declined to impute the knowledge of a
director and agent of a corporation to the corporation
when the agent was acting in his own interests in effectuating a sale of stock to a third party. The court said:
9

At best, even assuming that England did not know of defendant's judgment against plaintiff, England's purpose in securing the monies to reduce his debt to defendant would have
been defeated if Mr. Covey had been told of Strand's ownership
and had refused to participate in the conversion. It is significant
that England nowhere alleges that he told Covey of Strand's
ownership.
13
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The law is well settled that, in case tan} . . .
agent of a corporation transacts business in which
he is adversely interested, his knowledge respecting the particular transaction . . . is not imputable to the corporation, and hence it is not liable
for his acts. 192 P. at 669.
The court also quoted with approval the following language from E. S. Woodworth & Co. v. Carroll, 104 Minn,
65,112 N.W. 1054:
"The doctrine that a principal is chargeable with
notice of facts known to his agent is based on the
ground that it is the duty of the agent to communicate his knowledge to the principal, and that it is
to be presumed that he has performed this duty.
Ordinarily this presumption is conclusive. The reason of the rule ceases, however, where the agent is
dealing with the principal for his own purposes,
or where for other reasons his interest is adverse
to that of the principal, so that it is to his own
advantage not to impart his knowledge to the principal. It is accordingly well settled in the law that
a corporation is not chargeable with notice of facts
because of the knowledge on the part of the . . .
agent, where the . . . agent is dealing with the
corporation in his own interest, and where for
other reasons his interest is adverse to that of his
corporation, so that communication of knowledge
by him cannot be presumed." quoted at 192 p.
669-670 (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case Mr. England was acting in his
own interests in extinguishing his debt to defendant. In
addition, England must have known, in light of the statement contained in his affidavit as to the antagonism between the parties, of defendant's $34,000 judgment against
plaintiff Strand, and this knowledge made it mandatory,
14
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if his plan to liquidate his debt to defendant was to succeed, to keep knowledge of plaintiffs ownership of the
stock from defendant.
There is no authority applying a different rule to
cases involving negotiable instruments. The Arizona Supreme Court in Bank of America v. Barnett, 87 Ariz. 96,
348 P.2d 296 (I960) ruled that the knowledge of a lending institution which had endorsed certain notes to the
plaintiff bank could not be imputed to the bank even if
the lending institution had knowledge of the worthlessness of the consideration given for the notes and acted as
the bank's agent in certain matters:
United acted only as the bank's collection agent,
and — because United was a prior holder of the
notes and liable thereon in case of default and had
in fact made warranties to the bank at the time it
endorsed the notes in blank, which warranties are
in conflict with the knowledge which it is presumed to have had — . . . the position of United
was, in all other respects, adverse to that of the
bank. 348 P.2d at 298. (Emphasis in original)
Parallels can be drawn between the instant case and
the Bank of America case. In both, the scope of the agency
relationship did not include the transactions in issue, and
in both the position of the agent was adverse to the position of the principal — in the Bank of America case the
agent was a warrantor to the principal, in this case a
debtor.
Similarly in McLean v. Paddock, 78 N.M. 234, 430
P.2d 392 (1967), the New Mexico court ruled that the
knowledge of an original payee on a promissory note
15
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could not be imputed to the parties to whom he had endorsed it, even though the original payee acted as the
holder's agent by collecting and transferring the maker's
payments. After quoting §279 of the Restatement 2d,
Agency, the court said:
This rule has been applied to situations involving knowledge by an agent of equities or infirmities in promissory notes sold by the agent to the
principal [citations}. And under this rule the principal has been granted the status of bona fide purchaser despite the agent's knowledge of wrong
doing. 430 P.2d at 396.
In Hays v. Bank of Arizona, 57 Ariz. 8, 110 P.2d
235 (1941). the court held that the knowledge of a manager of a lumber company that the bank loaned him money
to pay off certain accounts he personally owed the company was not imputed when the manager was acting to
deceive the company.
The rule has also been applied in cases involving
negotiable securities in the determination of the status of
bona fide purchaser. In all of the following cases the courts
ruled that a principal was not bound by the knowledge of
its agent of adverse claims in securities when the principal and agent were in adverse positions: Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 57 Utah
88, 192 P. 664 (1920); George H. Sasser & Co. v. Chuck
WagonSystem, 50N.M. 136,172P.2d818 (1946); Steunenberg v. National Progressive Life Insurance Co., 138 Neb.
240, 292 N.W. 737 (1940); Tallhatchie Home Bank v.
Aldridge, 169 Miss. 597, 153 S. 818 (1934); Bloomberg v.
Taggart, 213 Minn. 39, 5 N.W.2d 388 (1942); Union Old
16
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Lowell National Bank v. Paine, 318 Mass. 313, 61 N.E.2d
666 (1945); Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, Peoria v. W.
Heller & Son, 305 111. App. 644, 27 N.E.2d 844 (1940);
Montgomery v. Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, 286
111. App. 241, 3 N.E.2d 139 (1936).
All of these cases stand for the principle that on a
showing of deceit by the agent against the principal, or
if the principal and the agent are in adverse positions
with respect to the transaction in question, the principal
will not be bound by the agent's knowledge.
T o summarize the rule of law stated in §279 of the
Restatement, the reporter's notes are helpful:
It is only where the agent acts as an agent that
the principal is affected by his knowledge
If an
agent does not act and does not purport to act as
an agent, but acts and purports to act on his own
account . . . the principal is not responsible for
his conduct or for his knowledge. Thus in accordance with the rule stated in this section, if the agent
deals with the principal . . . upon matters in
tvhich he is an adversary party, . . . acting on his
own account . . ., the fact that he commits a
breach of duty to his principal in acting or in failing to reveal facts in the transaction does not make
the principal responsible for the failure. Thus
one who is an agent has a duty to reveal all pertinent facts to the principal upon entering into a
transaction with him, but the failure to do so is a
failure by him as an individual and not a failure
by him as the principal's agent. Restatement 2d,
Agency, Appendix at 478-79 (1958). (Emphasis
added).
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In the instant case, it is clear that Mr. England was acting
on his own personal behalf, both in his dealings with the
plaintiff and with the defendant/Under the rules stated in
§279 of the Restatement of Agency and in numerous cases
from Utah and virtually every other jurisdiction, the fact
that Mr. England was defendant's agent for other purposes has no bearing on this case. Here his failure to reveal the true facts to his employer resulted from his personal interest in extinguishing his debt to that employer.
Since imputation of knowledge in this case was clear
error of law, the fact issue of defendant Prince-Covey &
Co's. knowledge of England's breach of duty to plaintiff
was directly in issue before the trial court on the face of
the contradictory pleadings and affidavits that were before it. The summary judgment violated Rule 56 and
should be reversed and remanded.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT NO ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED
CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S OWNERSHIP OF THE
STOCK.
Even if the bona fide purchaser question had not been
placed squarely in issue by the pleadings and affidavits
before the trial court, it was error for the court to determine that no issues of fact existed concerning plaintiff's
ownership of the Hoffman Resources stock. Plaintiff's
allegation in his complaint that he "owned" the stock
was specifically denied by defendant's answer. Mr. England's affidavit, in which his knowledge of plaintiffs
interest in the stock was asserted, was obviously self-serving and could not be contradicted by counter-affidavit
IB
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from defendant's own knowledge. As is shown by the
affidavit of Mr. Heyrend, plaintiff himself testified under
oath pursuant to an order in supplemental proceedings
that he did not own the Hoffman Resources stock on July
20, 1972. Accordingly, defendant's denial is based not
only on lack of knowledge but on the inference that if
plaintiff did not own the stock on July 20, 1972 he could
not have owned it on August 2, 1972, the date of the
alleged conversion, since on that date and at all times
from January 1972 to August 2, 1972 the stock was
pledged to and in the possession of Murray First Thrift
securing payment of a personal loan to Ted England.
England's statement of his belief of plaintiff's ownership could not have been contradicted by defendant because such statements are inherently uncontradictable
without the examination of the person making them. Faced
with this type of evidence in Cross v. United States, 336
F.2d 431 (1964), where a taxpayer had obtained summary
judgment on his claim that certain travel expenses should
be allowed as proper deductions from his income tax, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Grcuit
noted that:
Many of the facts [concerning the taxpayer's travel
as set forth in his affidavits} remain largely within
his own knowledge and the government should
have the opportunity to test his credibility on crossexamination . . . . 336 F.2d at 433
It went on to say that:
While we have recently emphasized that ordinarily
the bare allegations of the pleadings, unsupported
by specific evidentiary data, will not alone defeat
a motion for summary judgment [citation}, this
19
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principle does not justify summary relief where,
as here, the disputed questions of fact turn exclusively on the credibility of movant's witnesses.
Id.
The circuit ruled that the question could not be decided
by the affidavit alone, and reversed the trial court.10 While
in the instant case defendant's right to a trial does not
"turn exclusively on the credibility of movant's witnesses",
at least the question of plaintiff's ownership of the stock,
on the present state of the record, must have been decided
by the trial court exclusively on England's affidavit. Thus,
as to this fact the Cross rule must apply and must necessarily compel reversal of the summary judgment.
When England's affidavit is read in its entirety its
self-serving nature is apparent; his breach of duty to
plaintiff is admitted on its face, but only for the purpose
of establishing defendant's liability. In such circumstances
the credibility of the affiant himself properly becomes a
matter at issue, and credibility is not an issue that can be
disposed of at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment with only pleadings and affidavits before the court.
On the issue of ownership the demeanor and tone of England must be subjected to the test of trial, and for these
reasons defendant respectfully submits that the trial court
erred in accepting the pleadings and affidavit of Mr. England as establishing plaintiff's ownership interest in the
stock.
10

See also Armtein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Gir., 1940),
for a similar discussion concerning the propriety of summary
judgment based on self-serving affidavits.
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Summary judgment in the instant case necessarily
ignored the often repeated instructions of this court that a
showing supporting summary judgment must preclude
all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a
trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain
a judgment in his favor, see, e.g. Green v. Gam, 11 Utah
2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050 (1961); Frederick May & Co. v.
Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962).
Defendant respectfully submits that the allegations
and sworn statements upon which the trial court must
have based its findings of ownership do not meet this test.
As stated above plaintiff's only "proof" of his ownership
of the stock comes from the allegation of his complaint
and is denied by defendant's answer. Mr. England's allegation of plaintiff's ownership is simply unsupported
hearsay evidence of his belief which would have
been inadmissible to prove plaintiff's ownership in any
trial of this matter.
Plaintiff's right to summary judgment is improper
for other reasons as well. An essential element of an action for conversion is the defendant's intentional interference with plaintiff's right to immediate possession of the
property, Restatement 2d, Torts §222A. Thus, to prevail
in an action for conversion the plaintiff must show a right
to immediate possession of the property at the time it was
converted, Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 233 P.2d 365
(1951); Johnson v. Flowers, 119 Utah 425, 228 P.2d 406
(1951).
Even under plaintiffs own allegations he did not
have a right to immediate possession of the stock because
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it was twice pledged, once to England and once to Murray
First Thrift, by England, with plaintiffs permission. Although the stock was released from the pledge to Murray
First Thrift when England's loan was repaid, there is no
allegation that plaintiff ever performed whatever obligation was necessary to release the stock from the pledge to
England. Such consideration is obviously necessary if, as
plaintiff pleads, the stock was in fact pledged by him to
England, since the essence of a pledge is the passing of
possession by the owner to the pledgee who is entitled to
hold it until the debt is paid or the obligation is performed (see Campbell v. Peters, 108 Utah 565, 162 P.2d
754). If plaintiff did, in fact, "pledge" the stock to England, then he had no right to possession of it at the time
of the alleged conversion and would not have had such
right until he had performed or tendered the performance
of the obligation secured by the pledge. If, of course, it
was not pledged, then a multitude of issues arise concerning plaintiff's interests in the stock that could not be resolved by the pleadings and affidavits before the court.
In either event summary judgment was improper.

C. A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTED AS TO THE
PROPER DATE FOR FIXING DAMAGES.
The plaintiff accurately sets out the rule for fixing
damages for conversion of securities in paragraph 11 of
his complaint:
. . . the highest market value obtained for the
shares of Hoffman Resources, Inc. within a reasonable time after plaintiff had notice of the conversion.
22
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In paragraph 12 plaintiff alleges that the "highest market
value reached by Hoffman Resources, Inc. common stock
within a reasonable time after plaintiff had notice of the
conversion was $6.50 per share." Defendant denied this
allegation upon information and belief.11 Plaintiff does
not set out the time at which he received notice in his
complaint, nor does the affidavit of Mr, England state
when he might have informed plaintiff of his breach of
duty. Mr. Covey's affidavit makes it very clear that the
stock was not sold on September 13 as asserted by Mr.
Strand and Mr. England, but on August 2, approximately
six weeks earlier.
From this, two points are evident. First, the burden
was on plaintiff to establish notice of the conversion after
his allegation regarding notice was denied in the pleadings.
This plaintiff failed to do. Had this matter been tried and
had plaintiff brought on his expert to testify as to the
price of the stock on September 22, 1972, the defendant
would have objected that no foundation had been laid for
that date as a proper one on which to fix damages because
nothing was in evidence as to the date of plaintiff's notice
or knowledge of the conversion. Plaintiffs expert would
have been in no position to establish the date of notice.
Plaintiff would not have been heard to argue that his
allegation of time of notice established that fact and that
he need adduce no evidence for it. In fact, the testimony
of Mr. Strand or Mr. England would have been required
11

"If [a defendant] is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall
so state and this has the effect of a denial." Rule 8(b), Uah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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as to when Strand learned or was told of England's breach
of duty.
At the hearing for summary judgment, however,
plaintiff was allowed to establish his damages without any
proof of the date of his notice of the alleged conversion.
The fixing of such a date is a vital element in proof of
damages for conversion of stock, since the general rule and
the rule that has been announced in Utah is that the offended party is entitled to the highest price within a reasonable time after he has learned of the conversion, Western Secur. Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 57 Utah
88, 192 P. 664; Anno., "Conversion of Stock — Damages," 31 ALR3d 1286. It would be incongruous to allow
plaintiff to obtain summary judgment on a lesser showing
than he would be compelled to make at trial. Such a result would contradict both the express language of Rule
56 and this court's statement that, for purposes of summary judgment, if any material fact asserted by plaintiff
is contradicted by defendant, the facts as stated by defendant must be taken as true, Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 (1959).
Secondly, since the actual date of the sale of the stock,
as established by Mr. Covey's second affidavit, was August
2, 1972, and Mr. Strand apparently recalls that he received notice very soon after the sale, a substantial question is raised as to whether September 22 was within a reasonable time after the notice. Plaintiff himself says that
less than nine days is a reasonable time since he relies on
the price on September 22 and alleges that the sale took
place on September 13 and he learned of it soon afterwards.
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A "reasonable time" depends on many factors including
among others, the state of the market for the stock and
the reasonableness of the offended party's behavior after
notice, see §5[e}, Annotation, 31 ALR3d at 1332-34. On
the state of the record in this case, it would be fruitless to
argue what a reasonable time might be, but numerous
cases collected in the ALR Annotation just cited have
declared periods shorter than the 51 days between August
2 and September 22 to be unreasonable. More facts would
have to be before the court before this determination could
be made. This void in the record makes summary judgment improper.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND FOR REHEARING.
Upon its motion to set aside judgment and for rehearing, defendant amplified the evidence concerning its
relationship to Mr. England and showed that two important facts had not been brought to the attention of the
trial court upon plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
First, the affidavit of Michael F. Heyrend showed
that defendant's denial of plaintiff's ownership of the
stock in question was based upon inference, derived from
the examination of plaintiff under oath.
Secondly, the affidavit of Almon Covey established
that the sale of the stock occurred on August 2 rather than
September 13, as alleged by plaintiff.
25
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Mr, Heyrend's affidavit establishes that plaintiff had
testified under oath approximately thirteen days before
the sale of the stock that he did not own any Hoffman
Resources stock. Obviously he could not have obtained
the stock in the meantime since it was pledged at Murray
First Thrift. In addition, after his testimony as to his
impecuniousity given on July 20, it is hard to see how he
could have paid for over $13,500 worth of stock on August 2. Although these facts merely corroborate, substantiate, and make vivid and clear, defendant's contention that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to plaintiffs
ownership of the stock and as to the damages when the
summary judgment was entered, the trial court should
have applied Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and granted defendant relief from the summary judgment:
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: . . . (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Defendant concedes that none of the first six reasons
enumerated in Rule 60(b) is applicable to this situation.
However, relief under (7) of this rule was appropriate in
this case. Certainly no prejudice would accrue to plaintiff
by granting the relief requested, since he knew of his prior
sworn testimony concerning the ownership of the stock,
and the motion for relief was made expeditiously. Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully submits that the trial court
should have granted the motion.
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POINT III

...

IF JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT IS
AFFIRMED, THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER
A SET-OFF BETWEEN THIS JUDGMENT
AND A PRIOR FINAL JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY DEFENDANT AGAINST PLAINTIFF. , ,

On May 11, 1972, defendant Prince-Covey & Co.,
Inc. obtained a judgment against plaintiff Jerry Strand in
the amount of $34,696.16, together with interest and
costs, which was affirmed by this court in Prince-Covey
& Co., Inc. v. Strcmd, 29 Utah 2d 224, 507 P.2d 708. Despite diligent efforts by defendant, including the order in
supplemental proceedings of July 20,1972, in which plaintiff Strand testified under oath that he did not own any
Hoffman Resources stock or have any other assets upon
which execution could be levied, defendant to date has
been unable to satisfy any part of this judgment. If judgment for plaintiff is affirmed in this case, this court should
order satisfaction of it by set-off against the previous
judgment in defendant's favor. The principal amount of
defendant's judgment exceeds the amount of summary
judgment granted in this case by $8,696.16, which would
leave defendant with an unsatisfied judgment against
plaintiff in that amount plus accrued interest.
As a general rule, a judgment creditor may be forced
to accept in payment a judgment to which he is subject,
see generally 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §§999-1013,
Anno. 121 ALR 478 (1939); and Snow v. West, 37 Utah
528, 110 P. 52, 54 (1910) where the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the granting of set-off of judgments, saying:
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Whether mutual judgments should be set off and
satisfied in that way, rather than by the ordinary
method of enforcing them, rests largely within the
discretion of the court to which the application
is made. . . . Ordinarily . . . the application should
be made in equity and the matter should be controlled by equitable principles. 110 P.2d at 54
(Emphasis added).
Clearly the equities in this case demand a set-off of
the opposing judgments. Appellant has been diligent in
seeking to execute upon its judgment, yet has been unable to locate nonexempt assets of plaintiff Strand on
which to levy. If judgment in the present action is affirmed and no set-off granted, defendants will run the risk
of being forced to pay the judgment to plaintiff and then
losing any right to a return of such a payment to satisfy
its earlier judgment against plaintiff. If defendant were
forced to pay his judgment, there is no guarantee that it
could immediately levy execution on the funds so paid
since pre-existing liens might prevent effective execution.
Thus, the unjust result might occur that plaintiff would
be able to collect his judgment against defendant, but defendant would not be able to collect its pre-existing judgment against plaintiff because of intervening interests.
The fact that defendant did not plead set-off of the
prior judgment as a counterclaim should not preclude
this court from granting such a set-off. The prior judgment is not a compulsory counterclaim because it did not
"arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." Rule 13(a),
U.R.C.P. Hence, there is no requirement that it be affirmatively pleaded.
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Even though offset of the judgment might be asserted as a permissive counterclaim, the fact that it was not so
asserted does not preclude this court from ordering said
set-off since an appellate court has the power to grant
set-off between judgments; see, e.g. Welsher v. Libby, 107
Wis. 47, 82 N.W. 693 (1900); Annot. 121 ALR at 491.
Defendant submits that if the judgment below is not reversed, this would be an appropriate occasion for the
exercise of this power.
CONCLUSION
Numerous genuine issues of material fact remained
unresolved when the trial court entered its summary judgment. It was a clear error of law to impute Mr. England's
knowledge to defendant. For these reasons, the judgment
below should be reserved.
Respectfully submitted,
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD,
MILLER & GELDZAHLER
F. S. Prince, Jr.
Michael F. Heyrend
J. Rand Hirschi

29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPENDIX

A

(R. 1}
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JERRY STRAND,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PRINCE-COVEY AND COMPANY,
INC. and ALMON COVEY,
Defendants.

Complaint
Civil No.
217662

Plaintiff Alleges:
1. Prince Covey and Company, Inc. is a Utah corporation engaging in the over-the-counter brokerage business and doing busines in Salt Lake County, State of Utah
and the defendant Almon Covey is an individual residing
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2. Plaintiff was the owner of 6,000 shares of the
common stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc.
3. On or about the 13th day of January, 1972, the
plaintiff pledged with an individual, Ted England, his
6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources, Inc. for the specific
purpose of having Mr. England pledge those securities as
security for a loan.
4. That said individual Ted England was indebted
to the defendants.
5. At all times pertinent herein Ted England acted
as the agent and the employee of the defendant and the
defendant is liable for the actions of Ted England.
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6. That the defendant learned of the pledge of common stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc. at the lending institution which had loaned Mr. England the forementioned
moneys.
7. That at all times pertinent herein, the defendants,
and each of them, knew that the Hoffman Resources, Inc.
common stock which had been pledged as security for a
loan by Mr. England was in fact the property of the plaintiff.
[R. 2}
8. On September 13, 1972, the defendant Almon
Covey for himself and as agent of Prince Covey tendered
to the lending institution the sums borrowed by Mr. England and in return therefore received the common stock
owned by the plaintiff. Thereafter, contrary to the rights
of plaintiff, the defendants exercised ownership rights
over the common stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc. and,
upon information and belief, sold the same.
9. Upon information and belief, the proceeds from
the sale by defendant of plaintiff's stock were used to
liquidate indebtedness of Mr. England to the defendants.
10. The actions and conduct of the defendant in
exercising ownership rights and selling the common stock
owned by plaintiff, constitute an intentional conversion.
11. That as a result of the conversion of the plaintiff's common stock, the defendants are liable to plaintiff for the highest market value obtained for the shares
of Hoffman Resources, Inc. within a reasonable time after
plaintiff had notice of the conversion.

32

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12. The highest market value reached by Hoffman
Resources, Inc. common stock within a reasonable time
after plaintiff had notice of the conversion was $6.50 per
share.
13. The plaintiff is entitled to damages from the
defendant in the sum of $39,000.00.
14. Inasmuch as the action of the defendants was
intentional and full knowledge of plaintiff's rights to the
stock, the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in the
sum of $10,000.00.
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays judgment against the
defendant for the sum of $39,000.00 general damage together with $10,000.00 punitive damages, interest, costs,
and other relief the court deems just and proper.
DATED this 13 day of February, 1974.
RICHARD J. LEEDY
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APPENDIX

B

{R. 6}
ANSWER OF PRINCE COVEY & CO.
[heading deleted in printing]

Defendants, Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. and
Almon Covey, by and through their attorneys, Prince,
Yeates, Ward, Miller & Geldzahler, answer plaintiffs
Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim against defendants upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in
paragraph 1 of the Complaint.
3. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and
therefore deny same.
4. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Complaint and
therefore deny same.
5. Defendants admit that Ted England was indebted to defendant Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. Defendants deny that Ted England was indebted to Almon
Covey.
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6. Defendants deny the allegations contained in
CR. 7}
paragraph 5 of the Complaint,
7. Defendants admit that they learned of Ted England's pledge of Hoffman Resources stock, but deny that
they learned of plaintiff's "pledge" of the stock to Ted
England then or at any material time subsequent.
8. Defendants deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 7 of the Complaint.
9. Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint.
10. Defendants admit that the proceeds from the
sale of a portion of 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources,
Inc. were used to liquidate England's indebtedness to
Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. and deny every other
allegation contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint.
11. Defendants deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 10 of the Complaint.
12. Defendants deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 11 of the Complaint.
13. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint and
therefore deny same.
14. Defendants deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 13 of the Complaint.
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15. Defendants deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 14 of the Complaint.
THIRD DEFENSE
16. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to join an indispensable party, Ted England,
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintiff take
nothing by way of his Complaint and that defendants be
awarded costs and such other relief as the Court shall
deem just and proper.
Dated this 14th day of April, 1974.
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD,
MILLER & GELDZAHLER
F. S. Prince, Jr.
Michael F. Heyrend
Attorneys for Defendants
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APPENDIX

C

(R. 12}
AFFIDAVIT OF MACK McBRIDE
[heading deleted in printing]

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
: ss.
)

Mack McBride being first put on his oath deposes
and says:
1. That he is the office manager of Brown Securities,
an over-the-counter broker-dealer firm, located in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
2. That Brown Securities was a market maker in the
stock of Hoffman Resources Corporation during January
through December of 1972.
3. That affiant has reviewed the trading transaction
in Hoffman Resources Corporation for the period of time
of September 1972.
4. That affiant has ascertained from trading transactions that Hoffman Resources Corporation was quoted
on September 22, 1972, at $6.25 bid at $6.75 ask with
transactions being made at prices between the bid and ask
on that date.
DATED this the 28th day of June, 1974.
MACK McBRIDE
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this the 28th
day of June, 1974.
Rita Watts,
Notary Public, Residing in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
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APPENDIX

D

CR. 19}
AFFIDAVIT OF TED ENGLAND
[heading deleted in printing]

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

• SS.

Ted England being first put on his oath deposes and
says:
1. That he previously was employed as an account
executive and trader with Prince Covey and Company of
Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. Prince Covey and Company is an over the
counter brokerage firm and Almon Covey is the principal,
substantial stockholder, officer, and director of Prince
Covey and Company.
3. On or before the 13th day of January, 1972, your
affiant borrowed 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources common stock from plaintiff Jerry V. Strand.
4. Your affiant borrowed said shares to use as
collateral for a loan he was to secure with Murray First
Thrift of Salt Lake City, Utah.
5. That he was borrowing said money for the purpose of using the proceeds to pay to Prince Covey and
Company on losses that had been sustained by Prince
Covey and Company due to trading transactions in which
your affiant acted as the trader and also from customers
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failing to pay for stock purchases on accounts at Prince
Covey and Company which your affiant acted as account
executive.
6. A portion of the proceeds of the above loan were
paid for the purposes mentioned above.
CR. 20}
7. Prince Covey and Company had substantial losses
due to trading transactions in which I acted as trader and
for customers failing to pay for purchases in accounts
in which I acted as account executive.
8. As a result of those losses, your affiant, subsequent to the procurement of the loan, agreed with Almon
Covey to have Prince Covey and Company pay off the
above mentioned loans, obtain the pledged Hoffman Resources stock, and sell the same to mitigate those losses.
9. That on the 13th day of September, 1972, your
affiant in the company of Almon Covey, paid off affiant's
loan with Murray First Thrift.
10. Payment on that loan was made with a Prince
Covey and Company check.
11. At the time of the payoff of the loan, your
affiant and Almon Covey obtained possession of 4,000
shares of Hoffman Resources stock that had been pledged
to secure the loan; 2,000 shares having previously been
picked up by affiant and sold with the proceeds being paid
to Prince Covey; all 6,000 shares were owned by Jerry
V. Strand.
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12. Then Prince Covey and Company sold the Hoffman Resources stock.
13. The proceeds from the sale were divided to
cover the losses mentioned above and a portion was given
tome.
14. Jerry V. Strand got none of the proceeds from
the sale of his stock by Prince Covey and Company.
15. Your affiant knew that Jerry V. Strand and
Almon Covey were antagonists.
16. Almon Covey had prohibited your affiant from
making a market in Hoffman Resources stock at Prince
Covey and Company for the reason that he knew the stock
was being sponsored by Jerry V. Strand.
17. Almon Covey knew that your affiant was insolvent and did not have sufficient assets to pay off the
losses of Prince Covey and Company due to your affiant's
trading transactions and customers failure to pay.
18. It is common knowledge and my belief that
Almon Covey knew that very few persons would have
blocks of Hoffman Resources common stock as large as
6,000 shares and that Jerry V. Strand would be one of
those few persons that would have such a sizeable block
and that Almon Covey knew that your affiant would not
have ownership of such a large block of Hoffman Resources common stock.
{R. 21]
19. Almon Covey knew or should have known that
the stock which he took receipt of from Murray First
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Thrift and affiant belonged to Jerry V. Strand or, at
least, did not belong to affiant.
20. At any rate, your affiant, an employee and agent
of Prince Covey and Company, knew the Hoffman Resources stock belonged to Jerry V. Strand; that it was not
to be sold; that Mr. Strand did not authorize the sale
thereof; but the stock was only to be used as collateral for
loan; and that Jerry V. Strand never received any of the
proceeds from the sale or loan.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT.
DATED this 19th day of June, 1974.
TED ENGLAND
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
19th day of June, 1974.
J. V. Strand,
Notary Public.
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APPENDIX E
{R. 23)
AFFIDAVIT OF ALMON COVEY
[heading deleted in printing]
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

j

ALMON COVEY, being first duly sworn, on oath,
deposes and says:
1. Affiant is a defendant in the above-entitled action and is also President and director of co-defendant
Prince-Covey and Company, Inc.
2. Affiant at all material times was unaware that
plaintiff Jerry Strand claimed ownership or was in fact
owner of the 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock
which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, and affiant
had no reason to believe that plaintiff claimed ownership.
3. Plaintiff's name did not appear on the certificates
which were subsequently sold to liquidate Ted England's
debt to Prince-Covey and Company, Inc.
4. Only a portion of the 6,000 shares were sold to
liquidate the indebtedness of Ted England, and Ted England retained the balance of the shares, the disposition of
which by England is unknown to defenndants Almon
Covey and Prince-Covey and Company, Inc.
5. Defendants Almon Covey and Prince-Covey and
Company, Inc. were not aware of the solvency or insol-
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vency of Ted England, but were informed that Ted England had pledged Hoffman Resources stock to secure a
loan. Defendants Almon Covey and Prince-Covey and
Company, Inc. were not aware nor could they draw the
inference from the fact that since Ted England had a large
block of Hoffman Resources stock that it would follow
that Jerry Strand, the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, was in fact the owner of said shares.
6. If Ted England knew that plaintiff claimed an
interest in the Hoffman Resources stock, he misrepresented the ownership of the stock to defendants. All actions and representations made or engaged in by Ted
England covering the stock which is the subject matter of
the action were not within the scope of employment of
England, but were personal in nature.
Further affiant saith naught.
ALMON COVEY
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day
of July, 1974.
Connie C. Wilson,
Notary Public
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APPENDIX

F

(R. 35]
AFFIDAVIT OF ALMON COVEY
[heading deleted in printing]
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ALMON COVEY, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and says:
1. Affiant is an officer and director of defendant
corporation Prince-Covey and Company, Inc.
2. Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. is a brokerage
firm engaging principally as a broker-dealer in over-thecounter securities transactions.
3. During 1972 Ted England was employed as a
registered representative of Prince-Covey and Company,
Inc. His duties consisted of acting as broker and agent
for customers of Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
4. In this capacity, Ted England's duties consisted
of soliciting and taking orders for purchases and sales of
securities on behalf of customers and the furnishing of
investment information and advice.
5. Ted England was allowed to maintain, and did
maintain a private brokerage account at Prince-Covey and
Company, Inc., the use and maintenance of which were
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[R. 36}
entirely personal to Ted England and were not related
to his duties as a registered representative for PrinceCovey and Company, Inc.
6. Pursunt to an agreement between Prince-Covey
and Company, Inc. and Ted England, Ted England was
personally responsible to the company for any losses accruing to it by reason of unauthorized actions of administrative errors taken by him as a registered representative.
7.
During the course of England's employment,
England accrued a substantial debt to defendant corporation by virtue of such unauthorized actions and errors.
8. During the course of his employment, affiant had
numerous conversations with England concerning the
liquidation of that debt, which varied month to month as a
result of monthly accruals and payments made by England.
9. On or about the last of July or the first day of
August, affiant was informed by England that England
had secured a loan from Murray First Thrift some months
prior and that as security he had pledged over 4,000 shares
of Hoffman Resources stock, which stock was then worth
more than the balance of the debt to Murray First Thrift.
10. England proposed to affiant that Prince-Covey
and Company, Inc. advance England the loan balance,
that England would pay the loan, and that he would sell
the stock and pay the proceeds to Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. to reduce his indebtedness.
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11. On or about August 2, 1972, affiant directed
the issuance of a check, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by reference. The
check was made payable to Ted England and was in the
amount of $4,300.00.
12. On the same day affiant accompanied Ted England to Murray First Thrift, where the check was delivered to Murray First Thrift and said shares of Hoffman Resources stock were delivered to England. Said
stock was not registered in England's nor in plaintiffs
name, but was in bearer form.
13. Affiant and England then returned to the
CR. 37}
offices of Prince-Covey and Company, Inc.
14. England then sold the 4,000 shares of Hoffman
Resources stock obtained at Murray First Thrift and the
proceeds thereof were credited to his account. Attached
hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 2
are records of England's personal account through which
the sales were effected at a total sales price of $13,500.00.
Of this amount, $4,300.00 was retained by Prince-Covey
and Company, Inc. to repay its advance which was paid
to Murray First Thrift, and the balance of $9,200.00 was
applied to the reduction of England's debt to Prince-Covey
and Company, Inc. The balance of the shares received
from Murray First Thrift were retained by England and
affiant has no knowledge as to the disposition thereof.
15. England at all material times acted as principal
for himself under circumstances where defendant Prince-
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Covey and Company, Inc. and England were in opposition and were antagonists.
16. The repayment of the loan, the securing of the
stock, its sale and the subsequent application of the proceeds to England's indebtedness were acts of England
which bore no relation to England's duties at PrinceCovey and Company, Inc. other than the fact that the
debt owed to England to defendant corporation was incurred during his employment.
17. England at no time during the transactions acted
as agent for affiant or Prince-Covey and Company, Inc.
18. England at no time prior to this transaction indicated or implied to affiant that the Hoffman Resources
stock was plaintiff Strand's or that Strand claimed an
interest therein.
19. The records of England's personal account attached hereto as Exhibit 2, which records are maintained
in the usual and regular business of Prince-Covey and
Company, Inc. reveal that England during 1972 traded
large quantities of Hoffman Resources stock.
CR- 38]
Further affiant saith naught.
ALMON COVEY
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of
July, 1974.
Donald Jay Gamble
Notary Public residing at:
Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPENDIX

G

(R. 44}
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL F. HEYREND
[heading deleted in printing]
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

MICHAEL F. HEYREND, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
1. Affiant is legal counsel to Prince, Covey and
Company and was counsel for Prince Covey and Company in July of 1972.
2. Defendant Prince Covey and Company, on or
about May 11, 1972, was awarded judgment against Jerry
Strand after trial in the amount of $34,696.16 for Jerry
Strand's failure to pay for stocks after placing orders
through Prince Covey and Company.
3. Pursuant to an attempt to collect the judgment
which was entered against Jerry Strand in favor of Prince
Covey and Company, affiant caused the issuance of an
Order in Supplemental Proceedings compelling Jerry V.
Strand to appear in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to be examined concerning his assets and liabilities.
4. On or about July 20, 1972, plaintiff, in compliance with said order, appeared in the Third Judicial Dis-
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trict Court for Salt Lake County before the Court, where
he was duly sworn, placed upon the witness stand, and
examined by affiant.
CR. 45}
5. During the course of the examination of plaintiff, affiant asked plaintiff if he owned any stocks, and if
so, the names of each stock and the location.
6. Plaintiff stated to affiant that the only stock he
owned was 7,000 to 8,000 shares of Dusenburg Corporation stock which stock was pledged as security for a loan
procured by plaintiff at Murray First Thrift.
7. Plaintiff went on to state to affiant that he owned
options on 20,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock at
$3.00 per share and that the options were through Shamrock Fund in Los Angeles, California, but that he did
not own any Hoffman Resources stock.
8. Plaintiff at no time on July 20, 1972, mentioned
any interest in stock allegedly loaned to Ted England,
which loan plaintiff claims took place in January of 1972,
prior to the hearing.
9. Affiant next asked plaintiff if he held any stock
through nominees. Plaintiff responded that he had used
nominees in the past, but that no stock was held in the
name of nominees as of July 20, 1972.
10. Finally, affiant inquired as to any notes or other
choses in action held by plaintiff and was told that the
only amount owing to plaintiff was $5,000.00 owed to
plaintiff by Mr. Al Johnson.
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11. Affiant attempted to procure a transcript of the
above hearing, but was informed and believes that the
tapes made by the Certified Court Reporter were destroyed due to age.
FURTHER, affiant sayeth naught.
MICHAEL F. HEYREND
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
30th day of July, 1974.
Jacquelin Humphrey,
Notary Public
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPENDIX

H

CR. 46}
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID NELSON
[heading deleted in printing]

STATE OF UTAH

)
I SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

j

DAVID NELSON, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and says:
1. Affiant is an officer of defendant corporation
Prince-Covey and Company and is employed by the company, among other things, to maintain the records which
are kept in the usual course of business at Prince-Covey
and Company.
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct
copy of the appropriate records maintained by PrinceCovey and Company reflecting the personal account of
Ted England. Said records evidence that on August 2,
1972, 4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources were sold
through England's account, that prior thereto England
purchased and sold blocks of Hoffman Resources stock of
comparable size, and that no sale of this size took place
on or about September 22, 1974.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
DAVID NELSON
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of
July, 1974.
Nancy S. Druce,
Notary Public residing at:
Salt Lake City, Utah
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